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Abstract
This paper considers an entry-deterring nonlinear pricing problem faced by an incum-
bent rm of a network good. The analysis recognizes that the installed user base/network
of incumbent monopolist has preemptive power in deterring entry if the entrant's good is
incompatible with the incumbent's network. This power is, however, dramatically weakened
by the bounded rationality of consumers in the sense that it is vulnerable to small pessimistic
forecasting error when the marginal cost of entrants falls in some medium range. These nd-
ings provide a formal analysis that helps reconcile two seemingly contrasting phenomena:
on one hand, it is very dicult for a new, incompatible technology to gain a footing when
the product is subject to network externalities; on the other hand, new technologies may
frequently escape from inecient lock-in and supersede the old technologies even in the ab-
sence of backward incompatibility. Our results therefore shed light on how the market makes
transition between incompatible technology regimes.
Keywords: Nonlinear pricing, Entry deterrence, Network Externalities, Bounded rational-
ity.
JEL Codes: D42, D62, D82
1 Introduction
New entrants challenge the monopoly power and depress prots of incumbent rms. Incum-
bents are therefore strongly motivated to deter entry of newcomers. In fact, entry deterrence is
among a rm's most important strategic decisions and has long been a central issue in industrial
organization theory.
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When facing threat of entry, incumbent rms must decide how to respond. Early theoretical
research, notably by Bain (1956), Modigliani (1958), and Sylos-Labini (1962), emphasizes limit
pricing: an incumbent rm setting its pre-entry price low enough to make entry appear un-
protable. Various researches have oered explanations for limit pricing. Milgrom and Roberts
(1982a) show that when the entrant is uncertain about the incumbent's cost, the incumbent
tries to signal its low cost and then discourage entry by setting a low price. Kreps and Wilson
(1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982b) show that when the entrant is uncertain about the
incumbent's payos, the incumbent may have an incentive to cut prices even after entry as a
way to build a tough reputation for ghting future entry. Firms may use other types of signals
instead of or in addition to price to deter entry. Bagwell and Ramey (1988), Linnemer (1998),
and Bagwell (2007), among many others, show that advertising also has an entry-deterring ef-
fect. Espnola-Arredondo et al. (2014) investigate the signaling role of tax policy in promoting,
or hindering, the ability of a monopolist to practice entry deterrence.
In complete information environment, however, the limit pricing theory is criticized on the
grounds of credibility of commitment. Game-theoretic research has considered a variety of s-
trategies and conditions that might provide credible deterrents to entry. Some literature (Spence
(1977), Dixit (1980), Bulow et al. (1985), Maskin (1999), Allen et al. (2000), etc.) suggests
that, rms might hold excess capacity in order to deter entrants. Other devices such as R&D
expenditures, increased advertising, capital structure, exclusive contract, may also be used as
commitments to deter entry. (See Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), Aghion and Bolton (1987),
Tirole (1988), Segal and Whinston (2000) and Tarzijan (2007), among many others, for detailed
discussion.) In multiproduct environment, it is shown that strategies such as product prolifera-
tion, bundling, and diversication, are all eective entry-deterrent measures. (See Schmalensee
(1978), Omori and Yarrow (1982), Whinston (1990), Choi and Stefanadis (2001, 2006), Carlton
and Waldman (2002), and Nalebu (2004), etc., for detailed discussion.)
In many cases, network externalities may serve as barriers to market entry even when the
newcomers have superior technologies and oer lower prices. An obvious example is a telephone
network. In a world without interconnection, a user will not switch to a new telephone network
featuring better technologies at lower prices as long as there are no subscribers on that network
to communicate with. If all consumers postpone purchase of a product with network externalities
until the critical mass is reached, then new entrants will not be able to establish themselves. A
cheaper product or a product of better quality would not be sucient to gain a user base in the
face of strong network eects which guide users to previously established networks.
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In industrial practice, incumbent rms often purposely create network externalities to impede
entry. Examples are numerous, such as IBM's famous practice of requiring purchasers of its
tabulating machines to also purchase tabulating cards from IBM; Microsoft's attempts to bundle
Internet Explorer and Oce with Windows operating system to keep out a rival product (e.g.,
Linux)1; China Mobile's ghting against China Unicom by releasing Fetion, an instant messenger
software used only between China Mobile's subscribers.
It is of great importance to determine how the incumbent's strategies are aected by threat
of entry; how the installed user base of a network good can serve as an incumbent's preemptive
power to deter potential entry; and what factors inuence an incumbent's entry-deterring ability.
We answer these questions in the present paper by analyzing a nonlinear pricing problem faced
by an entry-deterring monopolist under asymmetric information and network externalities. 2
Our model diers from the existing literature along several dimensions.
First, this paper investigates the inuence of the consumers' bounded rationality on the
incumbent rm's entry-deterring ability. Even though entry deterrence has long been a central
issue in industrial organization theory, not much attention has been given to consumers. In most
existing literature, rms (usually an incumbent monopolist and a potential entrant) compete
with various forms of strategic weapons, while consumers do not play an active role. In our
model, however, the market power of incumbent monopolist depends crucially on consumers'
belief. We provide an entry-deterrence model where consumers choose whether or not to bypass
the present network based on their expectations. Equilibria at which consumers' initial belief on
network size is fullled in the sense that it is consistent with the actual outcome of the entry game
are characterized. We also show that, under certain conditions, these equilibria are unstable
in the sense that they are vulnerable to perturbation of initial expectation. Therefore, the
incumbent rm's entry-deterring ability is weakened when facing boundedly rational consumers.
This result rationalizes a substantial number of stylized facts that new technologies/brands
which have not yet built their own networks could successfully supersede the old and mature
technologies/brands with installed networks. It therefore throws light on how the market system
escapes from inecient lock-in due to network eects.
Second, this paper draws from and adds to the literature on mechanism design under bounded
1This practice sties competition by reducing the desirability of entry of competing rms into the market of
operating systems, and it is the main allegation in the antitrust case against Microsoft in 1998.
2In the context of network goods, Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) have shown that an incumbent monopolist
may have an incentive to charge a low price to build a large installed user base in order to deter entry with an
incompatible product. Their model, however, assumes away the possibility of performing price discrimination
across dierent groups of consumers, which is the focus of our analysis.
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rationality. The traditional mechanism design theory assumes that agents are able to forecast
correctly the key parameters in the economy and then respond rationally to the principal's oer,
so the correct design of mechanisms is decisive for achieving economic systems with good welfare
properties. Yet as agents usually lack full rationality, the designer's desirable outcome may not be
obtained any more. Intuitively, in a society populated by boundedly rational agents, the central
planner's policy objective may often fail or even converge to an undesirable outcome. A great
number of studies, both experimentally and theoretically, focus on the evolutionary properties
of mechanism under bounded rationality (See Chen and Gazzale (2004), Healy (2006), Chen
(2005, 2008), De Trenqualye (1988), Walker (1984), Cabrales (1999), Sandholm (2002, 2005),
Cabrales and Serrano (2011), Healy and Mathevet (2012), etc., for detailed discussion.) In these
existing studies, agents' bounded rationality is mainly modeled as their non-optimal reports to
the mechanism designer due to behavioral biases or forecasting error. We focus instead on a
setup where the agents are assumed to update gradually their participation decisions rather than
reports. This makes a main dierence between the previous works and ours: the equilibrium in
our model is at least semi-stable from above since the agents' consumption is controlled by the
principal as long as they accept the contract.
Third, this paper challenges the \no distortion at the top" convention by integrating t-
wo classes of literatures: network externalities and countervailing incentives. The canonical
principal-agent model makes two simplifying assumptions. First, there is no externality among
agents; second, an agent is assumed to obtain a minimal type-independent level of utility if he
rejects the oer made by the principal. Under these assumptions, the optimal contract exhibits
no distortion for the \best" type agent and downward distortions for all other types. (See for ex-
ample Mussa and Rosen (1978), Maskin and Riley (1984), Baron and Myerson (1982), Myerson
(1981), Hellwig (2010), Chade and Schlee (2012), among many others, for detailed discussion.)
Many studies challenge this result by relaxing the above two assumptions. Lockwood (2000)
shows that when the cost of any agent depends positively on his own eort and that of his
co-workers, the optimal contract oered by the principal exhibits a two-way distortion in out-
put. Hahn (2003) builds a model of telecommunication to examine the role of call and network
externalities in nonlinear pricing model. It is shown that the presence of call externalities leads
to downward distortions of the outgoing call quantity for all types of subscribers including the
highest type. Also in a nonlinear pricing setup, Csorba (2008) shows that the joint presence of
asymmetric information and positive network eects leads to a strict downward distortion for
all types of consumers in the quantities provided. The failure of \no distortion at the top" result
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makes an appearance also in the countervailing incentives problem where an agent's reservation
utility is type-dependent. Lewis and Sappington (1989) show in a regulation model that, when
the xed cost of a regulated rm is type-dependent, the output can be distorted above the ef-
cient level for some types and below the ecient level for others. Maggi and Rodriguee-Clare
(1995) give a complete analysis of the principal-agent problem with countervailing incentives.
They show that the pattern of the two-way distortion depends crucially on whether the reser-
vation utility of the agent is convex or concave in his private information. In our model, the
monopolist must provide each customer with surplus at least equal to the maximum utility they
could obtain from an outside market. As a result, the agent's participation constraint may be
type-dependent and countervailing incentives could arise. We fully characterize the optimal pure
monopoly and entry-deterring nonlinear pricing contracts for dierent kinds of network eects.
It is shown that the nonlinear pricing contract exhibits either one-way or two-way distortion in
quantities depending on the curvature properties of network. Therefore, our work incorporates
as special cases many existing studies, such as Lockwood (2000) and Csorba (2008). It is also
shown that the distortionary pattern of entry-deterring contract depends on both the properties
of network and eciency of outside competitors.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model.
Section 3 gives the benchmark results without entry threats. Section 4 analyzes the entry-
deterring model with, respectively, fully and boundedly rational agents. Finally, concluding
remarks are oered in Section 5.
2 The model
Consider a monopolist who produces a good exhibiting network eects at a constant marginal
cost c. There exists a continuum of consumers with heterogenous preferences for the good, and
this heterogeneity is captured by the one-dimensional parameter  with distribution function
F () and density f() over [; ]. As usual in the standard adverse selection model, we assume
the following monotone hazard rate properties.
ASSUMPTION 1 dd
h
1 F ()
f()
i
6 0 6 dd
h
F ()
f()
i
:
The preference of a customer of type  is represented by the linearly separable utility function
U(; q;Q; t) = v(q) + 
(Q)  t; (1)
where q is the amount he consumes (individual consumption), Q is the total quantity of the
product used by all customers in the market (often referred to as gross consumption or network
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size) and t is the tari charged by the seller. v(q) and 
(Q) are often referred to, respectively,
as intrinsic value and network value. The above specication shows that the network eect
is homogeneous, i.e., network value depends only on gross consumption rather than individual
consumption. We assume v0 > 0; v00 < 0, and the Inada conditions v0(q) ! 1 for q ! 0 and
v0(q) ! 0 for q ! 1. We also assume supQ2[0;+1)
0(Q) < c, the monopolist may otherwise
wish to produce unbounded output levels.
In the presence of network externalities, each agent's utility depends not only on his own trade
with the principal, but also on others' trades. The following properties of network externalities
are dened according to the inuences of an agent's trade on the other agents' total and marginal
utilities.
DEFINITION 1 (The sign of network externalities) Externalities are positive (negative, ab-
sent) if for all , U(; q(); Q; t()) is increasing (decreasing, constant) in q(0), for all 0 6= .
DEFINITION 2 (The curvature properties of network externalities) Externalities are (strict-
ly) increasing (decreasing, constant) if for all  2 [; ], Uq(; q(); Q; t()) is (strictly) increasing
(decreasing, constant) in q(0), for all 0 6= .
In network having positive externalities, a buyer benets from an increase in the consumption
of other buyers. In the situation with negative externalities, however, an increase of one con-
sumer's consumption hurts the others. This may arise due to congestion or internal competition.
Various kinds of networks, such as transportation, communication, and computer networks ex-
hibit congestion eects, whereby increased demand for certain network elements (e.g., roads,
telecommunication lines, and servers) tends to downgrade their performance or increase the cost
of using them. The curvature properties of externalities reect the change of marginal utilities
of an agent with the consumption of others. With increasing (decreasing) externalities, an agent
is more (less) eager to trade more when other agents trade more because the externalities at
higher trades are larger (smaller) than at lower trades.
If the utility function is twice dierentiable, the property of positive (negative, absent)
externalities involves the sign of rst order derivative @U@q(0) , while the property of increasing
(decreasing, constant) externalities involves the sign of cross partial derivative @
2U
@q()@q(0) . With
the special utility structure in this paper, the externalities are positive (negative, absent) if
and only if 
0(Q) > 0; (< 0;= 0) for all Q; while the externalities are increasing (decreasing,
constant) if and only if 
00(Q) > 0; (< 0;= 0) for all Q.
Suppose there exists an outside market composed of many identical potential entrants. Let
U0() represent the reservation utility available to an agent of type  when he rejects the contract
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and switches to the outside product. The seller cannot explicitly distinguish between customer
types prior to contracting. Thus, the entire menu of quantity-price pairs must be available
to all customers. The revelation principle ensures that the rm can restrict its attention to a
direct mechanism, i.e., a menu of quantity-price pairs fq(^); t(^)g, where ^ 2 [; ]. A contract
fq(^); t(^)g is said to be incentive feasible for Q if, for each , it satises incentive compatibility
and individual rationality constraints 3:
v(q()) + 
(Q)  t() > v(q(^)) + 
(Q)  t(^);8^ 2 [; ] (2)
v(q()) + 
(Q)  t() > U0(): (3)
The incumbent's objective is to choose an optimal contract to maximize his expected payo and
successfully deter entry under constraints (2) and (3).
3 Nonlinear pricing without entry threats
In order to give a benchmark result against which entry-deterring contract is compared, we
suppose in this section that the incumbent does not face the threat of entry. In this case, the
agents' reservation utility would be zero, i.e., U0() = 0 for all  2 [; ]. We now proceed to
analyze the incumbent's problem by considering in turn fully and boundedly rational agents.
3.1 Fully rational agents
In this subsection, the consumers are assumed to be fully rational in the sense that their common
expectation on the network size will be actually fullled, i.e., Q =
R 
 q()f()d. Let U() =
v(q())   t() + 
(Q) be the rent obtained by type , then it follows from the well-known
nonlinear pricing result of Maskin and Riley (1984) that the optimal fully rational (fullled
expectation) contract, denoted by fq (); t ()g, solves the following program.
[P] :
8>>>><>>>>:
max
fq();U()g
Z 

[v(q())  cq()  U()] f()d +
(Q)
s:t: : U 0() = v(q()); U() > 0; q0() > 0; Q =
Z 

q()f()d
(4)
Neglecting momentarily the monotonicity condition q0() > 0 and applying integration by parts
technique, the prot function can be rewritten as a functional of q(),
[q()] 
Z 


   1  F ()
f()

[v(q())  cq()] f()d +

 Z 

q()f()d
!
: (5)
3Since every agent is of measure zero, each agent takes Q as xed when deciding on his own announcement ^.
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Applying the calculus of variations, we can reformulate the principal's optimization problem as
[P"] : max
"2R
("); (6)
4 where
(") 
Z 


   1  F ()
f()

v(q () + "q())  c(q () + "q())

f()d
+

 Z 

(q () + "q())f()d
! :
If " = 0 maximizes P" (and thus q () maximizes P), then, for any xed admissible function
q(), we must have
0(0) =
Z 


   1  F ()
f()

v0(q ())  c+
0(Q )

q()f()d = 0: (7)
Since this is true for any variation q(), it follows that the continuous function which is the
coecient of q() under the integral sign must vanish identically on [; ]. We thus have the
Euler's equation: 
   1  F ()
f()

v0(q ()) + 
0(Q ) = c: (8)
Note that (8) equates the consumer's marginal revenue |taking into account informational rent
and the externality| to the marginal cost to the principal of an increase in q(). The rst term
on the left-hand side of (8) is the marginal intrinsic value in terms of virtual valuation of raising
q() incrementally, and the second term is the marginal network value of raising q(). Letting
q (;Q)  (v0) 1
h
(c  
0(Q))=

   1 F ()f()
i
and ' (Q)  R  q (;Q)f()d, we have that
the optimal network size Q  is a xed point of ' (Q), i.e., Q  = '(Q ) and q () = q(;Q ).
The existence of Q  is guaranteed by the boundedness of 
0(Q) and the Inada conditions.5
If the externalities are nonincreasing, i.e., 
00(Q) 6 0 for all Q, then ' (Q) is nonincreasing,
and Q  is thus determined uniquely. However, the uniqueness of xed points is not guaranteed
in the case of increasing externalities, wherein an increasing curve ' (Q) might cross the 45 line
several times. The monopolist thus simply picks one from the set Q = fQ 2 R+ j' (Q) = Qg
to maximize
 (Q) 
Z 


   1  F ()
f()

v(q (;Q))  cq (;Q)

f()d +

 Z 

q (;Q)f()d
!
:
4With a slight abuse of notation,  still represents the prot of the principal.
5It follows from condition supx2[0;+1) 

0(x) < c and Inada conditions that '(0) =
R 

q(; 0)f()d > 0,
'(+1) = limx!+1
R 

q(; x)f()d < +1. Since q (;Q) is continuous, so is ' (Q). Therefore, there exists a
Q  satisfying '(Q ) = Q .
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Consider the following parametrized form
(Q; ) 
Z 


   1  F ()
f()

v(q(;Q; ))  cq(;Q; )

f()d +

 Z 

q(;Q; )f()d
!
;
where q(;Q; ) = (v0) 1
n
[c  
0(Q)] =
h
   1 F ()f()
io
,  = 0 and  = 1 correspond respectively
to the rst-best and second-best cases. Note that
@
@Q
=
Z 



0('(Q; ))  
0(Q) @q
@Q
(;Q; )f()d = [
0('(Q; ))  
0(Q)] @'
@Q
;
where '(Q; ) =
R 
 q(;Q; )f()d, so in the case of strictly increasing externalities, any interior
maximizer of (Q; ) must be a xed point of '(Q; ). This allows us to search the optimal
network size Q() over the whole real line, i.e., argmaxQ2Q(Q; ) = argmaxQ2R(Q; ).
LEMMA 1 If 
00(Q) is of constant sign, given condition supQ2[0;+1)
0(Q) < c, a xed point
Q is optimal only if @'@Q 6 1.
PROOF. See appendix.
It could be seen from the expression of d=dQ that, at the optimum '(Q; ) must cross the
45 line from above. The points at which '(Q; ) is tangent to or crosses the 45 line from
below are not optimal. It follows directly from the rst order condition '(Q; )   Q = 0 that
dQ=d =  '(Q; )=['Q(Q; )  1] < 0. We thus obtain the following result.
LEMMA 2 If 
00(Q) is of constant sign, the network size with incomplete information shrinks
relative to the rst-best case, i.e., Q(1) < Q(0).
We can now turn to analyze the distortions induced by the presence of both asymmetric in-
formation and externalities at the second-best consumption q ()  q(;Q(1); 1) relative to the
rst-best consumption qf ()  q(;Q(0); 0). In the standard model without externalities, quan-
tity is distorted downward for all values of  except the highest. In the case with externalities,
however, this outcome can no longer be sustained.
THEOREM 1 The pattern of distortion in the second-best contract may depend on the curva-
ture properties of externalities:
 If network externalities are increasing, i.e., 
00(Q) > 0 for all Q, there is one-way distor-
tion: q () < qf (), for all  2 [; ];
 If externalities are decreasing, i.e., 
00(Q) < 0 for all Q, there exists two-way distortion:
9~ 2 (; ), q () > qf () for  2 (~; ] and q () < qf () for  2 [; ~);
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 If externalities are constant, i.e., 
00(Q) = 0 for all Q, then the standard result still holds:
q () < qf (); 8 2 [; ); q () = qf ().
PROOF. See appendix.
In the standard nonlinear pricing setup, the principal's rent extraction purpose motivates
her to reduce the consumptions for all but the most ecient types. This eect may still exist
in our model. Moreover, in our model, the principal also has an incentive to increase every
type's consumption and thus make the network more attractive. If the network is increasing,
the rent-extraction eect dominates the network-expansion eect for all types. As a result,
every type's consumption is lower than that in the rst-best case. If the network is decreasing,
however, for the higher types the network-expansion eect dominates, while for the lower types
the rent-extraction eect dominates, so two-way distortion is the outcome.
With decreasing externalities, an agent would be even more eager to trade more if he expects
the other agents trade less with the principal. Therefore, whenever an outcome Q  is fullled,
any initial expectation smaller (larger) than Q  will induce an actual aggregate consumption
larger (smaller) than Q , thus the optimal contract must be uniquely implemented. With
increasing externalities, however, an agent would be more eager to trade more if he expects the
other agents trade more. In this case, multiple equilibria are more of a norm than an exception.
This is due to the positive feedback associated with expectations: if all agents in the economy
believe something will not succeed, it will usually fail; on the contrary, if they expect it to
succeed, it usually will. Now we need some conditions ensuring the uniqueness of the xed point
of ' (Q). Let  be dened as (Q)  ' (Q) Q. Then a xed point of ' (Q) is a solution of
equation (Q) = 0. If Q  is unique, then (Q ) = 0 and (0) > 0 implies that  is nonnegative
everywhere on the line from Q  to 0. The following denition formalizes this property.
DEFINITION 3 The function g : R! R is radially quasiconcave (\R concave") if g(x) = 0
for some x > 0 implies g(x) > 0 for all  2 [0; 1]. If the strict inequality holds for all  2 (0; 1),
then g is strictly R concave.
Armed with this concept, we are now able to give a uniqueness result.
PROPOSITION 1 (The Uniqueness Result) Suppose that supQ2[0;1)
0(Q) < c, then ' (Q)
has a unique positive xed point if and only if (Q) = ' (Q) Q is strictly R concave.
PROOF. See appendix.
Remarks. (i) Since quasiconcavity (quasiconvexity) means convexity of upper (lower) contour
sets, a function (Q) is (strictly) R-concave if it is either (strictly) quasiconcave or (strictly)
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quasiconvex provided that (0) > 0 and limQ!+1 (Q) =  1, but not vice versa. Therefore,
any one of the following assumptions on (Q) is sucient (but not necessary) for equilibrium to
be unique: (a) it is strictly concave; (b) it is strictly convex; (c) it is decreasing; (d) it increases
slower than Q. Conditions (c) and (d) hold for decreasing or mildly increasing externalities. (ii)
Note that quasiconcavity (quasiconvexity) of ' (Q) does not necessarily imply the quasicon-
cavity (quasiconvexity) of (Q). (iii) It is clear that the strict version of R-concavity cannot be
replaced by the weak version. For example, function (Q) =  (Q  1)2(Q  2); Q 2 [0;1) sat-
ises (0) > 0; limQ!1 (Q) =  1. Also, it is R-concave but not strictly R-concave. Of course
the uniqueness result fails for this function. With increasing externalities, ' (Q) is increasing,
but (Q) is not necessarily R-concave. Therefore, multiple xed points may arise when function
' (Q) crosses the 45 line more than once. Throughout the rest of the paper, we assume (Q)
to be strictly R-concave to avoid multiple equilibria.
3.2 Boundedly rational agents
In the preceding subsection, the second-best contract fq (); t ()g is fullled if agents could
form rational expectations without any systematic forecasting errors about the real network
size. This is in line with the traditional neoclassical view propagated by Muth (1961) and Lucas
(1972). This result is in fact attributing too much information and rationality on the part of
agents. It is more reasonable to assume that agents are boundedly rational in their ability of
forecasting and decision-making. They modify adaptively their expectations over time on the
basis of observations of past performance. In this subsection, we will discuss whether or not
the fully rational equilibria may emerge as outcomes from repeated adaptive learning process of
boundedly rational agents.
Agents must form an expectation on network size one period ahead and make their partici-
pation decisions based on this expectation. Their adaptive learning process works as follows. At
time t, all the agents form a common expectation Qet of the network size, then consumers with
nonnegative expected utilities, i.e.,  2
n
 2 [; ]j R  v(q ())d > 
(Q )  
(Qet )o, accept the
contract fq (); t ()g.6 The rest of the agents will reject it and quit the market. This forms
6In this paper, the agents' beliefs are assumed to be homogeneous, i.e., all the agents have identical expectations
Qet . Please see Hommes (2006), LeBaron (2006), Hommes and Wagener (2009) and Chiarella et al. (2009), among
many others, for detailed discussion of models with heterogeneous expectations.
11
an actual network size Qt = (Q
e
t ), where
(x) =
8>>><>>>:
Q  if 
(x) 2 [
(Q );+1)R 
(x) q
 ()f()d if 
(x) 2
h
maxf0;
(Q )  R  v(q ())dg;
(Q )
0 if 
(x) 2
h
0;maxf0;
(Q )  R  v(q ())dg
;
(x) is given implicitly by
R 
 v(q
 ())d + 
(x) = 
(Q ) (see FIGURE 1). If Qt = Qet , the
ș ș
ș
ș
( ) v(q (ș))dșQ :  ³
( )Q:
*ș ( )e
t
Q
( )Q:
( )e
t
Q:
ș
Consumers
rejecting
the contract 
Consumers
accepting
the contract 
ș
ș
( ) v(q (ș))dșQ :  ³
FIGURE 1.
rational expectation outcome is reached; otherwise, the expectation is updated according to an
adaptive learning rule Qet+1 = Qt + (1   )Qet ; where  2 (0; 1] is the expectations weight
factor. The expected network size is a weighted average of yesterday's expected and realized
values, or equivalently, the expected network size is adapted by a factor  in the direction of
the most recent realization. This process is repeated until an expectation is self-fullled, i.e.,
Qet = Qt. Q
  is obviously a xed point of the feedback function ~(Q)  (Q) + (1   )Q.
In what follows, we will discuss whether or not the adaptive learning procedures will lead the
economy to converge to fully rational equilibrium (FRE).7 We rst introduce a few preliminary
denitions and lemmas.
7Throughout this paper, it is assumed implicitly that there is a new independent draw of the agents' types
every period, so there is no dynamic contracting issue arising from the gradual elimination of the informational
asymmetry over time. Moreover, the principal is assumed to believe that the agents are or will eventually be
rational. That is, the principal is irrational on the rationality of agents. Therefore, she will always provide the
fully rational contract fq (); t ()g in every period.
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DEFINITION 4 A xed point x of f(x) is called attractive if there exists a neighborhood
U(x) such that the iterated function sequence ff (n)(x)g converges to x for all x 2 U(x).
DEFINITION 5 A xed point x of f(x) is called Lyapunov stable if, for each  > 0, there is
a  > 0 such that for all x in the domain, if jx  xj < , jf (n)(x)  f (n)(x)j <  for all n 2 N.
DEFINITION 6 A xed point x of f(x) is called asymptotically stable (an attractor) if it
is Lyapunov stable and attractive; it is called neutrally stable if it is Lyapunov stable but not
attractive8; it is called unstable (a repeller) if it is not Lyapunov stable.
Lyapunov stability of an equilibrium means that solutions starting \close enough" to the equi-
librium remain \close enough" forever. If x is an unstable xed point, then there always exists
a starting value x very near to it so that the system moves far away from x upon iteration: 9 an
open interval I containing x, 8x 2 Infxg, 9n > 0 such that f (n)(x) =2 I. Asymptotic stability
means that solutions that start close enough not only remain close enough but also converge to
the equilibrium eventually. Neutral stability means for all initial values x near x, the solution
stays near but does not converge to x.9
LEMMA 3 Let x be a xed point of the discrete time dynamical system xn+1 = f(xn),
 if 0 6 f 0+(x) < 1(0 6 f 0 (x) < 1), then x is asymptotically stable from above (below);
 if f 0+(x) > 1(f 0 (x) > 1), then x is unstable from above (below).
PROOF. See appendix.
The above lemma leaves out the case with neutral xed point, i.e., f 0(x) = 1, wherein the
stability of x could not be determined until further information regarding higher-order terms
of Taylor expansion are available.10 Armed with Lemma 3, we are now able to characterize the
stability of Q .
PROPOSITION 2 If 
0(Q ) > v(q ())=f()q (), then Q  is unstable from below and
asymptotically stable from above; if 
0(Q ) < v(q ())=f()q (), then Q  is asymptotically
stable from both sides.
8It is also possible for a xed point to be attractive but not Lyapunov stable. For example, trajectories starting
at any point x0 may always go to a circle of radius r before converging to x
.
9The center of a linear homogeneous system with purely imaginary eigenvalues is an example of a neutrally
stable xed point.
10When x is neutral, \nothing denitive can be said about the behavior of points near x" (Holmgren (1991),
p.53), and several situations are possible: x may be stable, unstable, semistable or neutrally stable.
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PROOF. See appendix.
This theorem shows that when the externalities are negative or weakly positive at opti-
mum, the equilibrium is robust to small initial forecasting errors. Adaptive learning processes
of consumers lead the economy to converge toward the unique rational expectation equilibrium.
When the externalities are strongly positive, however, the equilibrium is only semi-stable from
above. The basic intuition behind this result is that the principal is capable of preventing the
overheating but not necessarily the overcooling of economy. The overoptimistic expectations of
consumers boost their participation in contracting but the good is not overconsumed since the
principal controls their total consumptions. However, overpessimistic expectations will decrease
the real network size since a set of consumers with positive measure will choose to quit the
market. 11 In the case with negative externalities, if all consumers initially form a shared over-
pessimistic prior on the network size, then a fraction of consumers will quit the market and the
good is actually underconsumed. The adaptive learning process will lead the consumers grad-
ually to an overoptimistic expectation. After that, all the consumers participate in contracting
and the expectation converges increasingly to the fully rational equilibrium. Things are dier-
ent for the case with positive externalities. If externalities are weakly positive and consumers
form an overpessimistic expectation, the realized network size will outperform their expectation,
then the consumers' over-pessimism disappears eventually. In contrast, with strongly positive
externalities, the low initial expectation reduces the real aggregate consumptions, which in turn
conrms the expectations. The eects that pessimism and depression reinforce each other lead
the network size to a very low level. Proposition 2 encompasses several special cases of interest,
which are depicted in the following FIGUREs 2 to 5 with  = 1.
 Case a. 
0(Q) > 0 for allQ 2 [0;+1), 
(Q ) > R  v(q ())d, 
0(Q ) < v(q ())=f()q ()
(Q) is strictly concave in
h

 1


(Q )  R  v(q ())d ; Q i : In this case, 9Q0 such
that Q > (Q); 8Q 2 [0; Q0) and Q < (Q); 8Q 2 (Q0; Q ). When the curve (Q) lies
below the 45 line, we have downward pressure on the consumption of the good: the re-
alized network size outcome will underperform the consumers' expectation, and there will
be a downward spiral in consumption. Correspondingly, when the curve (Q) lies above
the 45 line, we have upward pressure on the consumption of the good. Q0 is not just an
unstable equilibrium, but is actually a critical point, or a tipping point, in the success of
the good. If the rm producing the good can get the consumer's expectations for the total
11In the case with positive externalities, agents with expectations larger than the equilibrium value are called
\optimistic", and those who have expectations smaller than the equilibrium value are called \pessimistic". It is
opposite for negative externalities.
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consumption above Q0, then it can use the upward pressure of demand to get its market
share to the stable equilibrium at Q . On the contrary, if the consumer's expectations are
even slightly below Q0, then the downward pressure will tend to drive the market to shut
down. This result suggests that the success of a product depends crucially on consumers'
initial condence on it.
 Case b. 
0(Q) > 0 for all Q 2 [0;+1), 
(Q ) > R  v(q ())d, and function (Q) =
Q (Q) is strictly R-concave on (0;+1). In this case, function (Q) has two xed points
0 and Q . Since the curve (Q) lies below the 45 line, there is always downward pressure
on the consumption of the good. Any initial overoptimistic expectation will disappear
gradually. However, even a very small perturbation in the left will lead the market to shut
down.
 Case c. 
0(Q) > 0 for all Q 2 [0;+1), 
(Q ) 6 R  v(q ())d,  (Q) = (Q)  
Q is strictly R-concave on (0;+1). In this case (Q) has a unique xed point, where
(Q) crosses the 45 line from above. Therefore, Q  is globally stable. It is robust to
perturbation in any amount and either direction.
 Case d. 
0(Q) 6 0 for all Q 2 [0;+1). In this case Q  is also globally stable due to the
negative feedback eect.
'Q Q
( )e
t
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1[ ( ) ( ( )) ]Q v q d
T
  
T
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45DRealized network size Q
t
Shared expectation Qe
t
FIGURE 2. Case a
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4 Nonlinear pricing with entry threats
The monopolist in the above model may face a threat of entry from rival rms, whose product
is intrinsically a perfect substitute for the monopolist's product, but is incompatible with the
existing network. By virtue of being the incumbent, the monopolist's product generates network
value for all customers. The entrant's product, on the other hand, is assumed to provide only
its intrinsic value to the customers. This section discusses the optimal entry-deterring nonlinear
pricing contracts when consumers are, respectively, fully and boundedly rational.
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4.1 Fully rational agents
We assume that the competitive outside rivals set their price equal to their marginal cost
!. Therefore, in order to deter entry, the monopolist's pricing scheme must provide cus-
tomers of type  with a surplus of at least U0() = maxq2[0;1)[v(q)   !q]. Theoretically,
this is a principal-agent model with type-dependent individual rationality constraints. Let
q0()  argmaxq2[0;1)[v(q) !q], U()  v(q())  t()+
(Q) U0(). Facing fully rational
consumers, the monopolist's entry-deterring problem can be written as:
[Pe] : max
q();U()
Z 


v(q())  cq()  U0()  U() f()d +
(Q)
subject to:
U 0() = v(q())  v(q0()); q()is nondecreasing; U() > 0; Q =
Z 

q()f()d:
Note that the consumer's rents may either increase or decrease with  depending on the com-
parison between q() and q0(). If the quantity a consumer purchases from the incumbent rm
exceeds that from the outside rivals, rents rise with ; otherwise they fall with . Neglecting
momentarily the monotonicity condition of q() and checking it ex post, we can write the prin-
cipal's problem as a standard control problem with U as state variable and q as control variable.
The Hamiltonian function for this control problem would take the form
H(U; q; ; ) =

v(q())  cq() + U0()  U() f()
+ 

 Z 

q()f()d
!
+ ()[v(q())  v(q0())]
17
where  is the costate variable. The Lagrangian function is
L = H + ()U();
where () is the multiplier of constraint U() > 0. The rst-order condition for the maximiza-
tion of the Hamiltonian with respect to q is
 +
()
f()

v0(q()) + 
0(Q) = c: (9)
For a xed network size Q, all variables (q; ; U; ) being represented as functions of  and Q,
the following conditions must be satised:
costate equation:  =   @L
@U
= f()  () (10)
state equation: U = v(q(;Q))  v(q0()) (11)
complementary slackness: (;Q)U(;Q) = 0; (;Q) > 0; U(;Q) > 0 (12)
transversality conditions: (;Q)U(;Q) = (;Q)U(;Q) = 0; (13)
(;Q) 6 0; (;Q) > 0:
Let q^(; ;Q) denote the value of q that maximizes the Hamiltonian given ,  and Q dened
implicitly by (9), and let ^(;Q) be the solution in  to the following equation q^(; ;Q) =
q0(). It can be easily obtained ^(;Q) = [(c  
0(Q)) =!   1] f(), ^(;Q) is the value of
costate variable such that the agent's utility is constant (U = 0). From (10) and (12), we have
(;Q) = f()   (;Q) > 0, then there must be  6 f(). If the IR constraint is binding
on a nondegenerate interval, then (;Q) must be equal to ^(;Q) and  = ^ < f() on that
interval. To get an optimal costate function (), we impose the following assumption.
ASSUMPTION 2 Function F ()f() is nondecreasing.
This assumption is obviously a bit stronger than the usual monotone hazard rate condition which
only requires F ()=f() to be nondecreasing. In order to solve the problem, we conjecture a
solution and then verify whether or not it satises conditions (10) to (13). The critical work is
to construct the right solution for (;Q). Consider the following function,
(;Q) =
8>>><>>>:
F () if ^(;Q) > F ()
^(;Q) if F ()  1 < ^(;Q) < F ()
F ()  1 if ^(;Q) 6 F ()  1:
(14)
For simplicity, we dene 1,2, and 3 as the subintervals of  where 
(;Q) is equal to F (),
^(;Q) and F () 1, respectively. In order for (;Q) to satisfy the conditions (10) to (13), we
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need to check the condition  6 f(). It is obviously satised on 1 and 3. So we need only
to check  = ^(;Q) 6 f() for  2 2. Notice that ^(;Q) = [f() + f 0()]^(;Q)=f().
If f + f 0 > 0, then we have
^(;Q) <
F ()[f() + f 0()]
f()
6 f();
where the last inequality follows directly from Assumption 2. If f +f 0 < 0, then we also have
^(;Q) <
[F ()  1][f 0() + f()]
f()
6 f
2()  [1  F ()] f()
f()
= f()  1  F ()

6 f():
The second inequality follows from Assumption 1. Therefore, the optimal quantity
q(;Q)  q^((;Q); Q; ) =
8>>><>>>:
q+(;Q) if c 

0(Q)
! > 1 +
F ()
f()
q0() if 1  1 F ()f() < c 

0(Q)
! < 1 +
F ()
f()
q (;Q) if c 

0(Q)
! 6 1  1 F ()f()
(15)
is obviously nondecreasing in , where q (;Q) = (v0) 1
h
(c  
0(Q))=

   1 F ()f()
i
; q+(;Q) =
(v0) 1
h
(c  
0(Q))=

 + F ()f()
i
. We then need to distinguish the following cases, depicted in
FIGURE 6 to FIGURE 10, depending on the values of Q and !:
 CASE 1 c 
0(Q)! < 1  1f() . In this case ^(;Q) < F () 1 and thus q(;Q) = q (;Q)
for all  2 [; ];
 CASE 2 1   1f() 6 c 

0(Q)
! < 1. In this case F ()   1 6 ^(;Q) < 0;8 2 [;  (Q))
and ^(;Q) < F ()  1; 8 2 ( (Q); ]. Therefore, we have
q(;Q) =
8<: q0() if  2 [;  (Q))q (;Q) if  2 [ (Q); ] ;
where  (Q) is the critical type given implicitly by c 

0(Q)
! = 1  1 F ()f() ;
 CASE 3 c 
0(Q)! = 1. In this case ^(;Q) = 0, and q(;Q) = qf (;Q)  (v0) 1 [(c  
0(Q))=]
for all  2 [; ];
 CASE 4 1 < c 
0(Q)! < 1 + 1f() . In this case ^(;Q) > F () for  2 [; +(Q));
0 < ^(;Q) < F () for  2 [+(Q); ). Therefore, we have
q(;Q) =
8<: q+(;Q) if  2 [; +(Q))q0() if  2 [+(Q); )
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where +(Q) is the critical type given implicitly by c 

0(Q)
! = 1 +
F ()
f() ;
 CASE 5 c 
0(Q)! > 1 + 1f() . In this case, ^(;Q) > F () and thus q(;Q) = q+(;Q)
for all  2 [; ].
( )F  
( ) 1F  !
  
" #ˆ ,Q !
1
-1
FIGURE 6. Case 1: c 

0(Q)
! < 1  1f()
1
( )F  
( ) 1F  !
 
" #Q !
 
" #ˆ ,Q !
-1
FIGURE 7. Case 2: 1  1f() 6 c 

0(Q)
! < 1
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FIGURE 8. Case 3: c 
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FIGURE 9. Case 4: 1 < c 

0(Q)
! < 1 +
1
f()
'(Q)  R  q(;Q)f()d is consequently a piecewise function given by
'(Q) =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
'+(Q) if c 

0(Q)
! > 1 +
1
f()R +(Q)
 q
+(;Q)f()d +
R 
+(Q) q
0()f()d if 1 < c 

0(Q)
! < 1 +
1
f()
'f (Q) if c 

0(Q)
! = 1R  (Q)
 q
0()f()d +
R 
 (Q) q
 (;Q)f()d if 1 > c 

0(Q)
! > 1  1f()
' (Q) if c 

0(Q)
! < 1  1f()
; (16)
where 'i(Q) =
R 
 q
i(;Q)f()d, i 2 f ; f;+g. Let Qi be the xed point of 'i(Q), and qi() 
qi(;Qi); 8i 2 f+; f; g. We assume throughout this section that 'i(Q); i 2 f+; f; g are all
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FIGURE 10. Case 5: c 

0(Q)
! > 1 +
1
f()
strictly R-concave, then Qi are uniquely determined. It is easy to nd that Q  < Qf < Q+ and
[c  
0(Q )] =
h
1  1f()
i
= v0(q ()) > v0(qf ()) = c   
0(Qf ) = v0(qf ()) > v0(q+()) =
[c  
0(Q+)] =
h
1 + 1
f()
i
. 12 We now proceed to determine the xed point Q of '(Q) and
then characterize the optimal contract fU(); q()g. In particular, it is interesting to compare
the optimal allocation and network size with those in the full-information case.
THEOREM 2 Given assumptions (1) and (2), if the sign of 
00(Q) is constant on [0;+1),
supQ>0

0(Q) < c, and 'i(Q); 8i 2 f ; f;+g are all strictly R-concave, then the optimal nonlin-
ear pricing contract of incumbent rm changes with the marginal cost of potential entrants:
 If ! 2
h
c 
0(Q )
1 1=f() ;+1

, then Q = Q , q() = q (), U() =
R 


v(q ())  v(q0()) d; 8 2
[; ];
 If ! 2

c  
0(Qf ); c 
0(Q )1 1=f()

, then Q < Qf ,
q() =
8<: q0() if  2 [;  (Q))q (;Q) if  2 [ (Q); ] ;
U() =
8<: 0 if  2 [;  (Q))R 
 (Q)

v(q (;Q))  v(q0()) d if  2 [ (Q); ] ;
12Analogous to THEOREM 1, we have the following result: if 
00(Q) > 0; 8Q, then q+() > qf ();8 2 [; ]; if

00(Q) < 0; 8Q, then 9~ 2 [; ] such that q+() < qf (); 8 2 [; ~), q+() > qf (); 8 2 (~; ]; if 
00(Q) = 0;8Q,
then q+() = qf (), q+() > qf (); 8 2 (; ]. Therefore, if 
00(Q) has constant sign, we always have qf () <
q+().
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 If ! = c  
0(Qf ), then Q = Qf , q() = q0() = qf (); U()  0; 8 2 [; ];
 If ! 2

c 
0(Q+)
1+1=f()
; c  
0(Qf )

, then Q > Qf ,
q() =
8<: q0() if  2 [+(Q); ]q+(;Q) if  2 [; +(Q)) ;
U() =
8<:
R 
+(Q)

v(q+(;Q))  v(q0()) d if  2 [; +(Q))
0 if  2 [+(Q); ]
;
 If ! 2
h
0; c 

0(Q+)
1+1=f()
i
, then Q = Q+, q() = q+(), U() =
R 


v(q+())  v(q0()) d; 8 2
[; ].
PROOF. See appendix.
Facing potential entrants, consumers have an opportunity of using an alternative, incompat-
ible but competitively supplied good and the incumbent rm's prot may be depressed, so it is
in the interest of incumbents to deter entry if possible. Whether and to what extent would the
incumbent rm's pricing strategy be aected by entry threat has constituted a major theme in
the marketing and industrial organization literature. In the standard nonlinear pricing model,
where the reservation utility of consumers is independent of their types and normalized to zero,
a consumer has incentive to underreport his type to earn information rents. This will also be the
case in our model if the potential entrants are very inecient (! > [c 
0(Q )]=[1  1=f()]).
In this case, for all types of consumers, the incentive to understate their valuations to get in-
formation rents always outweighs the incentive to bypass the present network and get their
reservation utilities. Therefore, the pure monopoly pricing contract remains optimal. As the
potential entrants become more ecient (! 2 (c   
0(Qf ); [c   
0(Q )]=1   f())), the low
demand consumers prefer bypassing to staying in the network and understating their types.
Therefore, the principal has to oer them less distorted quantities to prevent them from quit-
ting the present network. If ! = c  
0(Qf ), all types have incentive to quit the market rather
than to misreport their types. So the principal nds that it is no longer optimal to distort
quantities away from the rst-best level. The remaining tool available to the principal to re-
tain all consumers in the market is the transfer t. In this case, all consumption levels are the
ecient ones. As ! continues to decrease, the outside market becomes attractive to the high
demand consumers, so the principal has to oer them quantities higher than the rst-best level
to prevent them from quitting. The low demand types are now attracted by the allocation given
to the high demand types. That is, they have incentive to overstate their types and thereby
23
convince the seller that greater reward is required to prevent them from switching to the outside
market. If the potential entrants are highly ecient with ! 6 [c  
0(Q+)] = 1 + 1=f(), then
for all types of consumers, the incentive to overstate always dominates their incentive to quit
the market, and the agent's participation constraint binds for the highest realization of .
For each type, if ! > c  
0(Qf ) (! < c  
0(Qf )), decreasing (increasing) his consumption
may (1) reduce the information rents obtained by the higher (lower) types; (2) decrease (increase)
the whole network value; (3) reduce (intensify) the congestion of network if the externalities are
decreasing. The joint presence of these three eects leads to complex patterns of contract
distortions, which are depicted in the following FIGUREs 11 to 15. In each gure, the red curve
represents the benchmark case with complete information, the blue curve represents the pure
monopoly case, while the green curve represents the case with entry threat. The distortionary
way of quantities is described in TABLE 1.
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The above results show that when network externalities are positive, subtracting a term

0(Q) from the incumbent rm's marginal cost c makes him more competitive in ghting against
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his rivals. That implies a network with positive externalities may serve as a powerful anti-
competitive weapon. It allows an inecient incumbent to successfully keep out an ecient
rival. It is very dicult for newcomers with more advanced but incompatible technology to
establish a market position. As a result, the incumbent rm may be reluctant to explore a
superior but incompatible technology in the presence of network externalities. In this sense, our
ndings are consistent with the famous lock-in argument 13: the diculty of gaining a footing
by a new, incompatible technology when a product is subject to network externalities. Despite
this argument's popularity, ample historical evidence suggests that many new, incompatible
technologies have been successfully introduced. For example, Microsoft Word was introduced
after WordPerfect dominated the market; MS-DOS was introduced and subsequently cornered
the market after CP/M-80 became established as the industry standard operating system. Cases
of lock-in to inferior technologies are rare in the long history of technological change (Liebowitz
13See Farrell and Saloner (1985, 1986), Katz and Shapiro (1985), Farrell and Klemperer (2004), among many
others, for detailed discussion.
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Properties IE CE DE
h
c 
0(Q )
1 1=f() ;+1

OWD OWD+NDT TWD
c  
0(Qf ); c 
0(Q )1 1=f()

OWD OWD+NDT TWD
c  
0(Qf ) ND ND ND
c 
0(Q+)
1+1=f()
; c  
0(Qf )

OWU OWU+NDB TWDh
0; c 

0(Q+)
1+1=f()
i
OWU OWU+NDB TWD
TABLE 1. IE: increasing externalities; CE: constant externalities; DE: decreasing externalities;
OWD: one-way downward distortion; OWU: one-way upward distortion; NDT: no distortion at
the top; ND: no distortion; NDB: no distortion at the bottom; TWD: two-way distortion.
26
and Margolis (1995)). These observations raise a question: under what circumstances and to
what extent will the entry-deterring power of network externalities be limited? In the sequel,
we are trying to answer these questions from the perspective of bounded rationality.
4.2 Boundedly rational agents
Analogous to the pure monopoly case described in Section 3, the optimal contract fq(); U()g
depends heavily on the rationality of agents. If agents are boundedly rational, this contract
may not necessarily be fullled. Given a common prior expectation Qet , consumers belonging to
(Qet ) 

 2 [; ]jU() > 
(Q)  
(Qet )
	
will accept the contract proposed by the principal,
then a network size of Qt = (Q
e
t ) 
R
(Qet )
q()d is actually realized. The feedback function
() is given as follows:
 If ! > c  
0(Qf ), then
(x) =
8>>><>>>:
Q if 
(x) 2 [
(Q);+1)R 
(x) q
()f()d if 
(x) 2
h
maxf0;
(Q)  R  [v(q())  v(q0())]dg;
(Q)
0 if 
(x) 2
h
0;maxf0;
(Q)  R  [v(q())  v(q0())]dg
;
where (x) is given implicitly by
R 
 [v(q
())  v(q0())]d +
(x) = 
(Q).
 If ! = c  
0(Qf ), then
(x) =
8<: Q if 
(x) 2 [
(Q);+1)0 if 
(x) 2 [0;
(Q)) ;
 If ! < c  
0(Qf ), then
(x) =
8>>><>>>:
Q if 
(x) 2 [
(Q);+1)R (x)
 q
()f()d if 
(x) 2
h
maxf0;
(Q)  R  [v(q0())  v(q())]dg;
(Q)
0 if 
(x) 2
h
0;maxf0;
(Q)  R  [v(q0())  v(q())]dg
;
where (x) is given implicitly by
R 
 [v(q
0())  v(q())]d +
(x) = 
(Q).
As shown in the preceding section, the consumers then update their expectation according to
Qet+1 = (1   )Qet + Qt, and this adaptive learning process will not end until an equilibri-
um is reached or the market is totally shut down. We can easily obtain that if 
0(Q) < 0,
then 0 (Q) = 0; 0+(Q) = 
0(Q)q((Q))f((Q))=jv(q((Q)))   v(q0((Q)))j < 0;
if 
0(Q) = 0, then 0+(Q) = 0 (Q) = 0; if 
0(Q) > 0, then 0+(Q) = 0; 0 (Q) =

0(Q)q((Q))f((Q))=jv(q((Q)))   v(q0((Q)))j > 0. Following the same logic as
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in the proof of Proposition 2, we nd that Q is asymptotically stable from both sides when

0(Q) 6 0; when 
0(Q) > 0, however, it is more likely to be unstable from below. The
following theorem summarizes the analysis above.
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THEOREM 3 The stability of Q depends on 
0(Q).
 If

0(Q) >
jv(q((Q)))  v(q0((Q)))j
f((Q))q((Q))
; (17)
then Q is unstable from below and asymptotically stable from above;
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 if

0(Q) <
jv(q((Q)))  v(q0((Q)))j
f((Q))q((Q))
; (18)
then Q is asymptotically stable from both sides.
If externalities are positive at the optimum, i.e., 
0(Q) > 0 , and ! falls in the intermediate
range, i.e., [c 
0(Q+)]=[1+1=f()] 6 ! 6 [c 
0(Q )]=[1  1=f()] , q0() = q()14, then
it is obvious that (17) holds. The following corollary summarizes this result.
COROLLARY 1 If 
0(Q) > 0 and ! 2 [c  
0(Q+)]=[1 + 1=f()]; [c  
0(Q )]=[1  1=f()],
then Q is asymptotically stable from above but unstable from below.
With intermediate !, a strictly positive measure of consumers earn zero rents. They are indif-
ferent between accepting and rejecting the contract (see FIGURE 16). A slightly pessimistic
initial expectation, i.e., Qe0 < Q
, will ignite positive network feedback, in which pessimism and
quitting alternatively reinforce each other, so the market may eventually collapse. There is no
way to reach point Q unless the initial expectation starts above or right at it (see FIGURE
17). This result suggests that the fullled expectation equilibrium is more vulnerable to pes-
simistic expectation than in the case without entry threat. In the presence of positive network
externalities, the incumbent market is sure to be occupied gradually by rivals with medium cost.
When a product is subject to network externalities, bounded rationality among users will tend
to make entry easy and therefore will boost technological innovations. In this sense, our results
also throw light on the transition between incompatible technology regimes and how the market
system escapes from lock-in.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we show how an incumbent monopolist performs price discrimination among cus-
tomers having dierent preferences and responses to potential entry threats. Network eects
can distort consumption levels across customers away from the canonical principal-agent model.
Curvature properties of network externalities are identied as factors responsible for the dif-
ferent distortionary patterns. We also investigate the stability of contract when consumers are
boundedly rational. We nd that the optimal equilibrium is always robust to optimistic expec-
tation, but is vulnerable to pessimistic expectation for strong positive externalities. Facing entry
14If c   
0(Qf ) 6 ! 6 [c   
0(Q )]=[1   1=f()], then  2 [;  (Q)]; if [c   
0(Q )]=[1 + 1=f()] 6 ! 6
c  
0(Qf ), then  2 [+(Q); ]. In both cases, q() = q0().
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threat, the incumbent rm's nonlinear pricing contracts exhibit a complex pattern of distortions
and are more likely to be unstable. Our results suggest that an incumbent may make use of
his installed network/user base to impede potential entry, but bounded rationality of consumers
imposes severe limitations on the entry-deterring ability of the incumbent rm.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. For non-increasing externalities, i.e., 
00(Q) 6 0; 8Q, the result is obvious.
We need only to prove it in the case with increasing externalities. Suppose that @'@Q > 1.
The boundedness condition supQ2[0;+1)
0(Q) < c ensures that for any  2 [0; 1], '(0; ) > 0
and '(+1; ) < +1. So there exist at least another two xed points Q1() 2 (0; Q()) and
Q2() 2 (Q();+1) such that '(Q; ) < Q for all Q 2 (Q1(); Q()) and '(Q; ) > Q for all
Q 2 (Q(); Q2()), which implies that d=dQ < 0 for all Q 2 (Q1(); Q()) and d=dQ > 0 for
all Q 2 (Q(); Q2()). This contradicts the fact that Q() is optimal (see FIGURE 18).
Q
Q
45D
FIGURE 18.
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Proof of Theorem 1. Lemma 2 shows that Q  < Qf .
 If 
00(Q) > 0; 8Q, then function q(;Q; ) is increasing in Q and decreasing in . Therefore,
q () = q(;Q ; 1) < q(;Qf ; 0) = qf (); 8 2 [; ].
 If 
00(Q) < 0; 8Q, then q(;Q; ) is decreasing in Q. We have q () = q(;Q ; 1) =
q(;Q ; 0) > q(;Qf ; 0) = qf (). Again from Q  < Qf , we must have q () < qf ().
Hence, there exists a type ~ 2 [; ] such that qf (~) = q (~). The nal step is to show that
such a ~ is unique. Since ~ is given by
h
   1 F ()f()
i
= = c 

0(Q )
c 
0(Qf ) and the LHS is strictly
decreasing in , the critical type ~ is unique.
 For the case 
00(Q) = 0;8Q, the result is obvious.
Proof of Proposition 1.
 Suciency : Given supQ2[0;1)
0(Q) < c, we have (0) > 0 and (Q) < 0 for suciently
large Q, then () has at least one zero point. Suppose that there exist two distinct points
Q1 < Q2 such that (Q1) = (Q2) = 0. Then () is obviously not strictly R-concave.
Therefore, ' (Q) has a unique xed point.
 Necessity : Suppose that Q > 0 is the unique zero point. If there exists a ~Q 2 (0; Q) such
that (Q) < 0, then, considering (0) > 0, there must exist another point Q 2 (0; ~Q)
such that (Q) = 0. It contradicts the assumption that Q is the unique zero point.
Therefore, we have (Q) > 0 for all  2 (0; 1).
Proof of Lemma 3. We only prove the cases from above, as the proof for the cases from below
is analogous. Linearizing f(x) at x around and larger than x with Taylor expansion:
f(x) = f(x) + f 0+(x
)(x  x) + o(x  x):
Applying triangular inequality, we get
 The case with 0 6 f 0+(x) < 1. In this case, we can take b 2 [0; 1) to be any number larger
than f 0+(x), then for x  x suciently small,
f(x)  f(x) 6 b(x  x):
So starting with x and iterating xn+1 = f(xn) gives a sequence of points with
f (n)(x)  x 6 bn(x  x):
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Hence, limn!1 fn(x) = x whenever x is close enough to x; for every  > 0, there exists
a () = bn such that f
(n)   x 6  whenever x   x 6 () for all n 2 R. Subsequently,
x is both Lyapunov stable and attractive, and it is therefore asymptotically stable.
 The case with f 0+(x) > 1. If f 0+(x) > 1, then for an arbitrary neighborhood U(x), there
exists x 2 U(x) such that
f(x)  x > b(x  x)
for some b 2 (1; f 0+(x)). Running iteration of this inequality yields
f (n)(x)  x > bn(x  x):
Hence, f (n)(x)  x goes to innity, and x is therefore unstable.
Proof of Proposition 2.
 If 
0(Q ) > v(q ())=f()q (), then 9 > 0 such that (Q) = Q  for allQ 2 (Q ; Q +)
and (Q) =
R 
(Q) v(q
 ())d for all Q 2 (Q    ;Q ). Therefore, ~0+(Q ) = 0+(Q ) +
(1   ) = 1    2 [0; 1), ~0 (Q ) = 0 (Q ) + (1   ) = 
0(Q )f()q ()=v(q ()) +
(1  ) 2 (1;+1). It follows from Lemma 3 that Q  is asymptotically stable from above
and unstable from below.
 If 0 6 
0(Q ) < v(q ())=f()q (), we still have ~0+(Q ) = 0+(Q ) + (1  ) 2 [0; 1),
but now ~0 (Q ) = 0 (Q ) + (1   ) = 
0(Q )f()q ()=v(q ()) + (1   ) 2 [0; 1).
It follows from Lemma 3 that Q  is asymptotically stable from both sides.
 If 
0(Q ) < 0, then 9 > 0 such that (Q) = Q  for all Q 2 (Q    ;Q ) and (Q) =R 
(Q) v(q
 ())d for all Q 2 (Q ; Q  + ). We have ~0 (Q ) = 1    2 [0; 1), ~0+(Q ) =

0(Q )f()q ()=v(q ()) + (1  ) < 1  . If ~0+(Q ) 2 [0; 1  ), then the stability
of Q  follows directly from Lemma 3, and we only need to consider the case of ~0+(Q ) 2
( 1; 0). Given ~0 (Q ) 2 [0; 1) and ~0+(Q ) < 0, there exists a 0 > 0 such that Qet 
~(t)(Qe0) is increasing and converges to Q
  for all initial expectations Qe0 2 (Q    0; Q ).
There also exists a 00 > 0 such that ~(Qe0) 2 (Q    0; Q ); 8Qe0 2 (Q ; Q  + 00). Let
 = minf0; 00g, then we have all terms of ~(t)(Qe0) fall in (Q    ;Q  + ) and converge
to Q  whenever Qe0 2 (Q    ;Q  + ). Therefore, Q  is asymptotically stable.
Proof of Theorem 2. The uniqueness of xed point Q is guaranteed by the boundedness of

0(Q) and strict R-concavity of 'i(Q); 8i 2 f ; f;+g. If 
00(Q) = 0 for all Q 2 [0;+1), then
[c 
0(Q)]=! is constant, the optimal consumption q() is obtained directly from 15, and from
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(10) to (13) we obtain the optimal utilities U(). In the sequel, we will prove the results hold
for the cases of strictly increasing and decreasing externalities. Let Q1; Q0; Q2 be points dened
as follows: [c  
0(Q1)] =! = 1 + 1=f(); [c  
0(Q0)] =! = 1; [c  
0(Q2)] =! = 1  1=f(). It
is clear that Q1 < Q0 < Q2 when 

00() > 0 and Q1 > Q0 > Q2 when 
00() < 0.
 If ! 2
h
c 
0(Q )
1 1=f() ;+1

, then the 45 line intersects '(Q) at point (Q ; ' (Q )). We have
Q = Q  > (6)Q2 whenever 
00 > (<)0 (see FIGURE 19). Consequently, [c 
0(Q)]=! <
1 1=f() for either 
00(Q) > 0 or 
00(Q) < 0. From the analysis in main text (CASE 1),
it is clear that q() = q (;Q )  q () and U() = R  v(q ())  v(q0()) d; 8 2
[; ].
 If ! 2

c  
0(Qf ); c 
0(Q )1 1=f()

, then the intersection of 45 line and '(Q) lies between
(Q0; '
f (Q0)) and (Q2; '
 (Q2)), and Q < Qf . If 
00(Q) > 0; 8Q 2 [0;+1), we have Q0 <
Q < Q2, therefore 1 = [c  
0(Q0)] =! > [c  
0(Q)] =! > [c  
0(Q2)] =! = 1 1=f();
if 
00(Q) < 0; 8Q 2 [0;+1), then Q2 < Q < Q0, and we also have 1 = [c  
0(Q0)] =! >
[c  
0(Q)] =! > [c  
0(Q2)] =! = 1  1=f() (see FIGURE 20). It falls in CASE 2 of
the main text analysis. Therefore, we have
q() =
8<: q0() if  2 [;  (Q))q (;Q) if  2 [ (Q); ] ;
U() =
8<: 0 if  2 [;  (Q))R 
 (Q)

v(q (;Q))  v(q0()) d if  2 [ (Q); ] :
 If ! = c   
0(Qf ), then the 45 line goes through the point (Q0; 'f (Q0)) (see FIGURE
21). It is clear that Q = Q0 = Qf . As shown in CASE 3 of the preceding discussions,
q() = qf (;Qf )  qf () and U()  0 for all  2 [; ].
 If ! 2

c 
0(Q+)
1+1=f()
; c  
0(Qf )

, then Q > Qf and Q 2 (Q1; Q0) (resp. Q 2 (Q0; Q1))
whenever 
00(Q) > 0 (resp. 
00(Q) < 0), 8Q 2 [0;+1) (see FIGURE 22). We have
1 < [c  
0(Q)] =! < 1 + 1=f() for either increasing or decreasing externalities. Our
discussion of CASE 4 shows that
q() =
8<: q0() if  2 [+(Q); ]q+(;Q) if  2 [; +(Q)) ;
U() =
8<:
R 
+(Q)

v(q+(;Q))  v(q0()) d if  2 [; +(Q))
0 if  2 [+(Q); ]
:
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 If ! 2
h
0; c 

0(Q+)
1+1=f()
i
, then the 45 line intersects '(Q) at point (Q+; '+(Q+)) (see FIG-
URE 23). It follows from the preceding discussion of CASE 5 that q() = q+(),
U() =
R 


v(q+())  v(q0()) d; 8 2 [; ].
1Q 0Q 2Q

Q
f
Q

Q
M*( )Q
45o
* *( , )Q Q
Q


M
M
M
( )
( )
( )
f
Q
Q
Q
(a) increasing externalities
M*( )Q
45o
* *( , )Q Q
QQ fQ Q 2Q      0Q        1Q


M
M
M
( )
( )
( )
f
Q
Q
Q
(b) decreasing externalities
FIGURE 19. ! > c 

0(Q )
1  1
f()
M
1Q 0Q

Q 2Q
f
Q

Q
M*( )Q* *( , )Q Q
Q

M
M
( )
( )
( )
f
Q
Q
Q
45o
(a) increasing externalities
M*( )Q
45o
* *( , )Q Q
Q
2Q

Q
f
Q

Q 0Q 1Q


M
M
M
( )
( )
( )
f
Q
Q
Q
(b) decreasing externalities
FIGURE 20. c  
0(Qf ) < ! < c 
0(Q )
1  1
f()
34

Q 1Q  0fQ Q 2Q Q
M*( )Q
* *( , )Q Q
45o


M
M
M
( )
( )
( )
f
Q
Q
Q
Q
(a) increasing externalities
M*( )Q
45o
* *( , )Q Q
2Q

Q  0fQ Q 1Q


M
M
M
( )
( )
( )
f
Q
Q
Q

Q
Q
(b) decreasing externalities
FIGURE 21. ! = c  
0(Qf )

Q
f
Q 1Q 0Q 2Q

Q
M*( )Q
* *( , )Q Q
Q
M

M
M
( )
( )
( )
f
Q
Q
Q
45o
(a) increasing externalities
M*( )Q
45o
* *( , )Q Q
2Q 0Q

Q
f
Q

Q 1Q


M
M
M
( )
( )
( )
f
Q
Q
Q
Q
(b) decreasing externalities
FIGURE 22. c 

0(Q+)
1+ 1
f()
< ! < c  
0(Qf )

Q
f
Q

Q 1Q 0Q 2Q
M*( )Q* *( , )Q Q
Q
(a) increasing externalities
M*( )Q
45o
* *( , )Q Q
2Q 0Q

Q
f
Q

Q


M
M
M
( )
( )
( )
f
Q
Q
Q
Q
1Q
(b) decreasing externalities
FIGURE 23. 0 6 ! 6 c 

0(Q+)
1+ 1
f()
35
References
[1] Aghion, P. and Bolton, P., (1987), \Contracts as a Barrier to Entry", American Economic
Review, 77, 388-401
[2] Allen, B., Deneckere, R., Faith, T., and Kovenock, D., (2000), \Capacity precommitment as
a barrier to entry: a Bertrand-Edgeworth approach", Economic Theory, 15, 501-530
[3] Bagwell, K. (2007), \Signalling and Entry Deterrence: A Multi-dimensional Analysis", Rand
Journal of Economics, 38, 670-697
[4] Bagwell, K., and G. Ramey, (1988), \Advertising and limit pricing", Rand Journal of Eco-
nomics, 19, 59-71
[5] Bagwell, K., and G. Ramey, (1990), \Advertising and pricing to deter or accommodate entry
when demand is unknown", International Journal of Industrial Organization, 8, 93-113
[6] Bagwell, K., and G. Ramey, (1991), \Oligopoly limit pricing", Rand Journal of Economics,
22, 155-172
[7] Bain, Joe S., (1956), \Barriers to New Competition", Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ.
Press
[8] Baron, D., and R. Myerson, (1982), \Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs", E-
conometrica, 50, 911-930.
[9] Bulow, J., Geanakoplos, J., and P. Klemperer, (1985), \Holding idle capacity to deter entry",
Economic Journal, 95, 178-182.
[10] Cabrales, A., (1999), \Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete
information", Journal of Economic Theory, 86, 159-184.
[11] Cabrales, A., and Serrano, R., (2011), \Implementation in adaptive better-response dynam-
ics: Towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms", Games and Economic
Behavior, 73, 360-374
[12] Carlton, D., and Waldman, M., (2002), \The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create
Market Power in Industries", The Rand Journal of Economics, 33, 194-220
[13] Chade, H., and Schlee, E., (2012), \Optimal Insurance in Adverse Selection", Theoretical
Economics, 7, 571-607.
36
[14] Chen, Y., (2005), \Dynamic stability of Nash-ecient public goods mechanisms: Recon-
ciling theory and experiments". In: Zwick, R., Rapoport, A. (Eds.), Experimental Business
Research. Vol. II. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Norwell, MA.
[15] Chen, Y., (2008), \Incentive compatible mechanisms for pure public goods: A survey of
experimental research", In: Plott, C. R., Smith, V. (Eds.), The Handbook of Experimental
Economics Results, Vol. 1. North Holland, Amsterdam.
[16] Chen, Y., and Gazzale, R., (2004), \When does learning in games generate convergence
to Nash equilibria? The role of supermodularity in an experimental setting", American
Economic Review, 95, 1505-1535.
[17] Choi, J., and Stefanadis, C., (2001), \Tying, Investment, and the Dynamic Leverage The-
ory", Rand Journal of Economics, 32, 52-71.
[18] Choi, J., and Stefanadis, C., (2006), \Bundling, Entry Deterrence, and Specialist Innova-
tors", The Journal of Business, 79, 2575-2594
[19] Csorba, G. (2008), \Screening Contracts in The Presence of Positive Network Eects",
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 26, 213-226
[20] De Trenqualye, P., (1989), \Stable implementation of Lindahl allocations", Economics Let-
ters, 29, 291-294.
[21] Dixit, A., (1980), \The role of investment in entry-deterrence", Economic Journal, 90,
95-106.
[22] Espnola-Arredondo, A., Mu~noz-Garcia, F., and Jude Bayham, (2014), \The Entry-
Deterring Eects of Inexible Regulation", Canadian Journal of Economics, 47, 298-324
[23] Farrell, J. and Saloner, G., (1985), \Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation", Rand
Journal of Economics, 16, 70-83.
[24] Farrell, J., Saloner, G., (1986), \Installed base and compatibility: innovation, product
preannouncements, and predation", American Economic Review, 76, 940-955.
[25] Farrell, J., P. Klemperer. (2004), \Coordination and lock-in: Competition with switching
costs and network eects", M. Armstrong, R. H. Porter, eds. Handbook of Industrial Orga-
nization, Vol. 3. North Holland, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
37
[26] Fudenberg, D., J. Tirole, (1984), \The fat cat eect, the puppy dog ploy and the lean and
hungry look", American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 74, 361-366
[27] Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J., (2000), \Pricing a Network Good to Deter Entry", Journal
of Industrial Economics, 48, 373-390
[28] Hahn, J., (2003), \Nonlinear Pricing of Telecommunication with Call and Network Exter-
nalities", International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21, 949-967
[29] Healy, P., (2006), \Learning dynamics for mechanism design: An experimental comparison
of public goods mechanisms", Journal of Economic Theory, 129, 114-149.
[30] Healy, P., and Mathevet, L., (2012), \Designing stable mechanisms for economic environ-
ments", Theoretical Economics, 7, 609-661
[31] Hellwig, M., (2010), \Incentive problems with unidimensional hidden characteristics: a
unied approach", Econometrica, 78, 1201{1237
[32] Holmgren, R., (1991), \A First Course in Discrete Dynamical Systems", Springer-Verlag.
[33] Hommes, C., (2006), \Heterogeneous agent models in economics and nance", In: Tesfat-
sion, L. and Judd, K.L., (eds), Handbook of Computational Economics, Volume 2: Agent-
Based Comp. Econ., chapter 23, North-Holland, 1109-1186.
[34] Hommes, C., and Wagener, F., (2009), \Complex Evolutionary Systems in Behavioral Fi-
nance", In: T. Hens and K.R. Schenk-Hoppe (Eds.), Handbook of Financial Markets: Dy-
namics and Evolution, Elsevier, 217-276.
[35] Katz, M. L., and Shapiro, C., (1985), \Network externalities, competition, and compatibil-
ity", American Economic Review, 75, 424-440.
[36] Kreps, D.M., Wilson, R., (1982), \Reputation and imperfect information", Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 27, 253-279.
[37] LeBaron, B. (2006), \Agent-based Computational Finance", Handbook of Computational
Economics, Volume 2: Agent-Based Computational Economics, chapter 24, L. Tesfatsion
and K.L. Judd (Eds.), North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1187-1233.
[38] Liebowitz,S. J., Margolis, S., (1995), \Path dependence, lock-in, and history", Journal of
Law, Economics and Organization, 11, 205-226.
38
[39] Lewis, T., and Sappington, D., (1989), \Countervailing Incentives in Agency Problems",
Journal of Economic Theory, 49, 294-313
[40] Linnemer, L., (1998), \Entry deterrence, product quality: price and advertising as signals",
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 7, 615-646.
[41] Lockwood, B., (2000), \Production Externalities and Two-way Distortion in Principal-
multiagent Problems", Journal of Economic Theory, 92, 144-166.
[42] Lucas, R., (1972), \Expectations and the Neutrality of Money", Journal of Economic The-
ory, 4, 103-124.
[43] Maggi, G., and Rodriguez-Clare., A., (1995), \On countervailing incentives", Journal of
Economic Theory, 66, 238-263.
[44] Maskin, E. and Riley, J., (1984), \Monopoly with Incomplete Information", Rand Journal
of Economics, 15, 171-196.
[45] Maskin, E., (1999), \Uncertainty and entry deterrence", Economic Theory, 14, 429-437
[46] Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J., (1982a), \Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Infor-
mation", Econometrica, 50, 443-460.
[47] Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J., (1982b), \Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence",
Journal of Economic Theory, 27, 280-312.
[48] Modigliani, F., (1958), \New Developments on the Oligopoly Front", Journal of Political
Economy, 66, 215-232.
[49] Mussa, M. and Rosen, S. (1978), \Monopoly and Product Quality", Journal of Economic
Theory, 18, 301-317.
[50] Muth, John F. (1961), \Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements", E-
conometrica, 29, 315-335
[51] Myerson, R. (1981), \Optimal Auction Design", Mathematics of Operations Research, 6,
58-73.
[52] Nalebu. B, (2004), \Bundling as an Entry Barrier", The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
119, 159-187
39
[53] Omori, T. and Yarrow, G. (1982), \Product Diversication, Entry Prevention and Limit
Pricing", Bell Journal of Economics, 13, 242-248.
[54] Sandholm, W., (2002), \Evolutionary implementation and congestion pricing", Review of
Economic Studies, 69, 667-689.
[55] Sandholm, W., (2005), \Negative externalities and evolutionary implementation", Review
of Economic Studies, 72, 885-915.
[56] Schmalensee, R. (1978), \Entry Deterrence in the Ready-to-Eat Breakfast Cereal Industry",
Bell Journal of Economics, 9, 305-327.
[57] Segal, I., (1999), \Contracting with Externalities", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114,
337-388.
[58] Segal, I., and Whinston, M., (2000), \Exclusive contracts and protection of investments",
The Rand Journal of Economics, 31, 603-633.
[59] Spence, A., (1977), \Entry, capacity, investment and oligopolistic pricing", Bell Journal of
Economics, 8, 534-544.
[60] Sylos-Labini, P., (1962), \Oligopoly and Technical Papers", Cambridge: Harvard University
Press
[61] Tarzijan, J., (2007), \Capital Structure and Entry Deterrence with Multiple Incumbents",
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 7, 1-18
[62] Tirole, J., (1988), \The Theory of Industrial Organization", Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
[63] Topkis, D., (1998), \Supermodularity and Complementarity", Princeton University Press,
Princeton, N.J.
[64] Walker, M., (1984), \A simple auctioneerless mechanism with walrasian properties", Jour-
nal of Economic Theory, 32, 111-127.
[65] Whinston, M., (1990), \Tying, foreclosure, and exclusion", American Economic Review,
80, 837-859
40
